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Speech of Senator MD{e Mansfield (D., Montana) 
For Release on Delivery 
BEYOi.ID Till MIDDLE EAST CRISIS 
Mr. President: 
Thanl~s to the \lork of the brilliant and indefatigable Deputy 
Under Secretary of State (Mr. Murphy) 11e may yet extricate ourselves from 
a very delicate position in Lebanon. vle may yet escape a costly and ever-
deepening involvement in the Middle East. We may yet avoid the chain-
reaction leading to the great conflict, a chain-reaction \vhich uas risked 
\then troops vrere put into Lebanon. 
If \le come out of this situation in this fashion, vTe may count 
ourselves very fortunate. nut, Mr. President, vre cannot ahrays bank on 
luck. On the contrary, unless 1re build policies on sterner stuff, we shall 
gaze over the brinlt once too often and one of these days vre shall lose our 
footing. 
That is \vhy I thinlt it is essential that we explore \·Ti thout 
delay the lessons that are implicit in the current crisis in the Middle 
East. I think it is essential that 11e grasp their significance before 
this experience, like so many others, slips into the dimming past, its 
meaning lost to us. I suggest the need for such an exploration regardless 
of hovr we come out of the present crisis, whether the nation emerges un-
scathed or damaged to a greater or lesser degree. 
Let me make clear, ~rr. President, that I am not suggesting a 
post-mortem on policy in the Middle East. A post-mortem is hardly 
possible on a policy vhich not only has not yet died but has yet to be 
born. \-!hat I am suggesting is that the intensification of the crisis in 
the Middle East may afford us one more opportunity -- perhaps the last --
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to bring a constructive Middle Eastern policy into being. If \·Te do have 
that opportunity then let us not vraste it. Let us see to it that this 
policy gets underway. Let us see to it that it develops in a rational 
fashion towards rational national ends. 
I can conceive of no better way to begin on this task than to 
isolate the principal factors which have brought upon us the present un-
fortunate state of affairs. And, make no mistrute about it, Mr. President, 
we are confronted with a most unfortunate state of affairs in the Middle 
East. In this connection, let me say that I can understand a point of view 
which regards our predicament in Lebanon as necessary or unavoidable although 
I may not agree with that view. I cannot, however, see anything in the pre-
dicament to elate anyone in this country. ~t best, we are in a situation 
which will have cost the people of the United States countless millions of 
dollars for our own military operations in the eastern Mediterranean and 
Lebanon. Add to this cost, countless millions more for emergency military 
aid to Lebanon and write off the tens of millions in military aid extended 
to Iraq in the foolish expectation that it would help to keep that country 
friendly to the West. These hundreds of millions of dollars \vill have pro-
duced, at best, a sullen acquiesence in the Middle East, a bowing to our 
superior force until such time as a new challenge to us can be contrived. 
At best, we will have brought upon ourselves an opprobrium on the 
part of many people in the Middle East whose memories are scarred with a 
deep hatred of foreign troops on their soil. Thanks to the superb military 
conduct of our forces in Lebanon perhaps this adverse consequence may be 
minimized. It vvill be minimized, however, only if these forces are not 
compelled toiLunge more deeply into the Middle East, only if their with-
drawal is fairly prompt and without serious incident. 
\ 
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That, Mr. President, is the meaning of the present situation in 
the Middle East, at best. I do not need to detail what this situation might 
mean at vorst. Clearly, it could mean a long involvement of American forces 
demanding billions of dollars of expenditures over the years. It could also 
mean var, the great war. These possibilities vere inherent in the action 
vhich plunged us suddenly into Lebanon and they are still inherent in the 
situation in vhich ve find ourselves. 
We may have been shocked to have avakened one morning to the fact 
that ve were involved in a military sense in the Middle East. \ole ought not 
to have been. Events vere trending in that direction for a long time and 
little was done to alter the trend. The Secretary of State for several 
weeks prior to the action had said that military measures might be forth-
coming. For an even longer time, the Senate had been aware of this likeli-
hood. Some of us addressed ourselves to the problem and warned that unless 
a more positive and constructive stand were taken, the nation ran the grave 
risk of war in the Middle Bast. 
These warnings went largely unheeded. The Executive Branch 
drifted along in the same pattern of the past, enclosed in the feeble 
cocoon of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The cocoon did not protect anyone 
from anything. It merely shut out the disturbing sight of the accumulating 
difficulties in the Middle East and gave a false sense of security to the 
nation. Encased in the cocoon of its own fantasies, the Executive Branch 
evaded the realities of the Middle East until it could no longer evade them. 
Then when it finally acted, it was compelled to act in a military fashion. 
It acted, in short, with too much, too late. 
Our use of military force in the Middle East may be a positive 
act but a positive military act is not to be confused with a positive 
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foreign policy. On the contrary, it is the antithesis of such a policy. 
The use of military force signifies the absence of policy or the breakdown 
of policy. In this case, Mr. President, it is the former. We have not had 
a Middle Eastern policy or, at best, we have had only the generalities of 
such a policy. 
It is time, Mr. President, to ask the ''why". Why have we lacked 
a constructive policy in the Middle East? vfuy have we permitted matters to 
drift until we were dra\vn in a military fashion into this region? Was it 
really the fault of the Russians? Whether or not it was, it will make 
little difference in the adverse consequences which will flow to us from 
this act. It will not do much good to blame the Russians. The foreign 
troops in plain view of the Middle Easterners are American and British, not 
Russian. It is we who are in the exposed military position, not the Russians. 
It is time to ask why we are in this position. It is essential 
that we ask why, since there may still be an opportunity to set and pursue 
a positive policy for the Middle East if we can answer the question accu-
rately. 
Mr. President, I shall not take the time of the Senate to review 
the detailed events in the Middle East leading to this moment. The Senate 
is not unfamiliar with them. Hhat is important to the nation is the signifi-
cance of these events. What do they mean in terms of the adequacy with which 
the nation's foreign relations are being conducted? I think it will be help-
ful to the nation if out of our individual efforts to answer this question 
some common wisdom emerges. 
Each Senator is free to analyse the problem as he sees fit. In 
the interpretation which I am about to give to the Senate, let me stress 
that I do not mean to be critical in a personal sense of the President and 
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the Secretary of State. It is true, they have primary and ultimate responsi-
bility in foreign relations. It is also true, however, that decisions in 
foreign policy stem from the work of many in the Executive Branch. And it 
is also true that >That is said and done in the Congress is not without its 
influence in these matters. 
If we ask ourselves how we came to be involved in this predicament 
in the Middle East, I believe that we shall find a key to the answer in what 
has been an absence of understanding of our national purpose in that region. 
We have not had clearly in mind our over-riding interests. Some may see 
those interests in terms of the need to take a firm stand against the Russians 
or communism. But against whom, Mr. Pre~dent, are the United States forces 
now standing in Lebru1on? I venture to suggest that there is not a Russian 
combat soldier within sight of the Lebanese frontier. The fact is that we 
are not standing against Russians in Lebanon. We are not even confronting 
them. And I suspect that we are not even confronting many local communists. 
To seek to relate the action which we have pursued in Lebanon to tWting a 
firm stand against aggressive communism has the ring of Don Quixote jousting 
,.,i th the windmills. 
If the stopping of communism can hardly be our over-riding interest 
since it is not present in this situation, neither ought our supreme interest 
be the maintenance of a sterile status quo in the Middle East. I cannot see 
what interest at all this country can have in preserving a stability com-
pounded, as it is in that region, too largely of irresponsible and oppressive 
governments, military dictators, social rot and economic stagnation. 
ITor can the over-riding interest of this nation lie in supporting 
this group of Arabs over that, or Arab over Israeli or Israeli over Arab. 
Hor can it lie even in securing access to the petroleum of the Middle East, 
hm-1ever important that may be. 
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Our fundamental interests in the Middle East are, or ought to be, 
the preservation of peace, the emergence of peaceful and popularly respon-
sible governments, and the social and economic progress of the ordinary 
peoples of the Middle East, Arab and Israeli alike. It is these interests 
which serve all the people of the United States. It is these interests 
which must be advanced before all others. I regret to say that I have seen 
few signs, except in words, that the supremacy of these interests is fully 
appreciated by those responsible for the conduct of foreign policy. I do 
not mean, Mr. President, that these officials do not have an appreciation 
of them. I mean only that their actions do not adequately reflect them. 
Mr. President, if we are to advance these supreme interests of 
the United States in the Middle East we have got to have not only a full 
recognition of them on the part of the Executive Branch, we have also got 
to have an unbiased and accurate understanding of the fprces at work in 
the Middle East which might advance or impede the interests. Only with 
that kind of understanding is there any hope of making intelligent day-to-
day decisions of policy. 
I have seen few signs that we have had that kind of understanding. 
I have seen many indications to the contrary. One day we are given the im-
pression by the Executive Bramch that Mr. ~lasser is not such a bad chap. 
The next day he truces on the appearnace of a monster. One day we are as-
sured that ~abs, as good Moslems, are communist-resistant. The next we 
are warned of the imminent dangers of communism in the Arab lands. One day, 
Iraq is billed as the most stable and progressive country in the Middle East, 
ruled by friends of the West. The next day the heads of our presumed friends 
roll in the streets of Baghdad and, symbolically at least, our own roll with 
them. Yet, there is scarecely a ripple of protest from the Iraqi people. 
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One day we virtually ignore Lebanon and the next we are so concerned as to 
land marines on its shores. One day we condemn the British for sending forces 
to Suez and the next we join them on a highly dangerous jaunt in the Holy 
Lands. 
Mr. President, it is not necessary to labor the point. It is 
clear that our actions in the Middle East over the past few years suggest 
a headless policy with many tails. It is not easy for an American to under-
stand this strange behavior. How much more difficult to explain it to the 
rest of the world which, having a very vital stake in peace, bas a most 
proper concern in what we do or do not do in the Middle East? 
I repeat this erratic course which we have followed in the Middle 
East seems to me to stem in part from a failure to appreciate our over-riding 
interests in the peace of that region and in peaceful, responsible, free and 
progressive governments in that part of the world. It seems to stem in part, 
too, from our failure to understand accurately the forces at work which lead 
towards and a1vay from the realization of these interests. In short, we have 
not known where we most want to go in the Middle East, let alone how to get 
there. 
Unfortunately, Mr. President, it has become too characteristic of 
the conduct of the foreign policy of the nation in recent years to follow 
the nevr adage: when in doubt do something. Apparently, the tendency to 
follow this adage, Mr. President, accounted for the Eisenhower Doctrine of 
1957. The Senate will recall that many of us had grave misgivings about 
this piece of legislation at the time it was considered. We did nat like its 
advanced press agentry. H'e did not lilte its constitutional implications. vle 
went along with it because the President sought it in terms of critical na-
tional necessity. We went along with it, notwithstanding the fact that it 
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seemed to us to divert national efforts to a random pursuit of the communist 
apparition flitting from one end of the Middle East to the other while it 
ignored the inner difficulties which threatened the peace of that region. 
vle believed that without a positive policy directed at these difficulties, 
our basic interest in peace would remain in jeopardy and our basic interest 
in the peaceful progress of the nations of the Middle East would remain un-
attainable. Further, we believed that the very danger which the Administra-
tion feared most vould not be met by this doctrine but might instead be in-
tensified by it: that is, that the nations of the Middle East would veer 
more sharply towards communism. 
I introduced amendments to the Eisenhower Doctrine, ~1r. President, 
in an attempt to bring it closer to grips with the inner difficulties of the 
Middle East. I sought to add to the effort which the Administration proposed 
to make against the intangible problem of communism, a simultaneo~s effort to 
meet tangible difficulties in the Middle East. My intent, Mr. President, was 
to turn the doctrine from an essentially negative holding action into a posi-
tive policy for peace. Many members of the Senate advocated the same adjust-
ment of effort. 
But the Administration chose to oppose the changes in the Eisenhower 
Doctrine which were suggested in the Senate. It was successful. It suc-
ceeded in defeating, largely on party lines, two amendments which I offered~ 
In retrospect, Mr. President, were these such terrible changes which I had 
suggested? I do not think so. The first merely called upon the President 
to take an international initiative in trying to curb the arms traffic in 
the Middle East. The second was an attemptto end scatter-shot and wasteful 
aid to the Middle East by calling upon the President to trute the initiative 
in developing a regional program of economic development which would be inter-
related with the encouragement of peace and stability in that region. 
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These two amendments, as I said, Mr. President, were defeated. A 
third, Mr. President, was passed by the Senate over the objections of the 
Executive Branch. Has that amendment hurt the Administration? I do not 
think so. vlliat it did, Mr. President, was merely to emphasize the full sup-
port of the nation for the United iJations Emergency Force which was and is 
the one bright spot in the otherwise dismal Middle Eastern scene. 
There have been some press reports, Mr. President, \·rhich indicate 
that the Administration \rill advocate at a summit conference, the substance 
of all three of these amendments which were offered in the Senate to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, along with other ideas since advocated in Congress. 
If these reports are accurate, the Administration will do now, as a basis 
of a constructive initiative for peace in the Middle East, what it objected 
to doing 18 months ago. 
I most certainly hope that these reports are accurate. I hope 
the administration will go to the impending conference fully prepared to 
take an initiative for peace. I hope that it will be prepared to strike 
boldly for agreement which \rill embrace the following principles: 
l. The strengthening of the UH force in the Middle East to the 
point where it can be used on any border threatened with military invasion 
in that region. 
2. The curbing of indirect aggression in the Middle East whetre r 
it be by incitation to assassination and mob action, border raids or other 
forms of attack short of outright military invasion. 
3. The mobilizing of international effort to bring about face-to-
face meetings between conflicting Arab leaders, and Arabs and Israelis, in a 
supreme effort to make the beginnings of a beginning in the settlement of the 
difficulties between them which have kept the Middle East on the brink of war 
for the past decade. 
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4. The establishment of control over the arms traffic among the 
nations which are in serious conflict in the Middle East, namely the Arab 
States and Israel, in order to reduce the level of military tension among 
them and to release the scarce resources now devoted to arms to the urgent 
constructive tasks of the region. 
5. The development of joint international programs which promise 
to benefit all the people of the Middle East by furthering the rapid economic 
and social progress of the region. 
I do not lmmr, Mr. President, whether agreement on these principles 
can be reached at any conference. Whether or not it can does not alter the 
fact that it is in our national interest to offer them. It is in our in-
terest, if only to make clear where we stand. It is in our interest, if 
only to get clear before the world who it is that talks peace and •rho it is 
that is prepared to act for peace. In short, Mr. President, I hope that 
there will be awrucened in the Executive Branch sufficient vigor, sufficient 
drive, sufficient leadership and sufficient perception to get us off dead 
center. If there is one single factor which more than any other has under-
mined the prestige of the United States before the world, it is the negative 
attitude that Branch has manifested towards efforts to get at basic inter-
national tensions. It has acted at times almost as though it has a vested 
interest in the perpetuation of these tensions. 
The hour is late, Mr. President, but it may not be too late to 
undo the damage which has been done in the Middle East. vfuether it is too 
late or not, it is still essential that we do not overlook a lesson that is 
involved in the Eisenhmver Doctrine. At the time this doctrine was before 
the Congress, the Executive Branch opposed, as I have already noted, attempts 
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to alter it in a fashion which would have laid the foundation for an affirma-
tive constructive policy in the Middle East. Even if it is prepared to go 
along with such a policy now, note, Mr. President, the time-lag of 18 months. 
To me, this time-lag suggests the absence of a clear understanding 
of our supreme interests in the Middle East and a leadership firm enough to 
assert those interests beyond all others. To me, Mr. President, this time-
lag indicates an Executive bureaucracy grown so top-heavy, timid and torpid 
that it produces neither the accurate information which is needed to under-
stand how to act nor the receptivity to the ideas which stimulate the 1vill 
to act. If that is the case ve are in far graver danger -- given the kind 
of world in which we live -- than any of us have heretofore suspected. 
A way must be found and found soon, Mr. President, to cut the lag 
between the time significant changes occur in the international scene and 
the time our __ p~~icl~s -~~e a~u~~~~-t~--~~et __ ~ese changes. Unless i ~ is ~c~--~~~ld~­
Y!~ shal~?_:, __ in_!_o:r_:=~~Z:_ :P_9.:li_~~ !or~ve~ _i~ p~rsui ~of th~-1~~~--step_ of_ t_h_~ . 
J,ast car of a train tba~-- is ~va.ys _p_ul:lin_e; awB:_y -~~!ll _u~. 
The problem of the time-lag in foreign policy undoubtedly has 
something to do with the way in which the Executive Branch is organized to 
deal with international relations. I believe, however, it is larger than 
that. It is also a problem of sufficient detachment and skill to recognize 
international realities as honestly and accurately as it is humanly possible 
to recognize them. It is also a problem of a willingness to come to grips 
with those realities. It is, finally, a problem of the courage to act on the 
dictates of those realities in a fashion which will be understood and appre-
ciated, not only by our own people but by decent people throughout the world. 
Mr. President, I have gone on at some length disc1.1ssing the signifi-
cance of the sorry experience which we are now undergoing in the Middle East. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 39, Folder 69, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 12 -
There is little which I can add to the Senate's lcnowledge of the facts of 
this particular problem. If I am correct, however, in my analysis of the 
principal causes of our difficulties in that region, then, the lessons we 
may draw from this experience are probably applicable not only in the Middle 
East but on a far broader scale. For, if _ ~ere is ~ misr~ading of o~_Q_y~r":' .. 
elsewhere. I!__ ~~~:.:._~-~~s~fi c:_i_e?~--~etachm:r_:~~~- _s~i_l_~--~ .!~C:~gni ze -~-e:~l~-:: . 
ti~s in th~- M~~~-=-~~~~~?_::._e_ _ i~ __ pro~a~~? __ insufficiei_l~_9-e~~_:bme~t __ ~<!_s_k~ll:_ 
as regards ot~~~-~:_:.~:_-If -~er_e J:~ -~--~-erio_~0ime_-:-_~~ in _F_<?lic~ in_!;he_ 
Middle East, __ we may_p_r_~~~~ -!hat there are similar time-lags in policy in 
other parts of the world. 
In these circumstances, Mr. President, >nll we wait in Europe as 
we have waited in the Middle East until we risk the loss of the chance to 
- -------- - ----- ----------· 
build a constructive peace? Will we t·re.it with regard to the Western Hemisphere , 
until those who have stood ·with us leave our side? Will we wait '-~'i th regard 
to Asia? 
The days go by st-riftly, Mr. President, and the situation does not 
stand still in these other parts of the world. We have already lost too 
many precious hours. vJP~!-_ _gn_ce was a unique O:EI?Ortuni ty to bu~!_~~--~u!:able_ 
~~ace throughout th_~ wo~ld has_]1_9~- bec~m~-~~ best ~!_lly~ass!~_C:!l~n_se_. 
The Senate knmrs, as I know, that no nation alone can create peace. 
But does that knowledge excuse inertia in our government? Does it forgive 
the continuance of the negative attitude ,.;bich has already cost us so much 
in terms of the world's respect and trust? Does it permit us to truce any 
course other than to leave no stone unturned in the search for peace? ITo 
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nation's stake in peace is grater than our own. fJO nation IS quest Of peace, 
That is why I urge, Mr. President, that we prepare ourselves to 
meet with any nation or nations, at any reasonable time, in any reasonable 
circumstances, if there is any promise of moving towards a more durable peace. 
We \Till not be prepared for meetings \nth anyone, at the summit, 
half-way up or on the bottom, however, unless we have constructive policies 
which are in harmony with today's realities rather than yesterday's hopes. 
\ole will not be prepared unless we have constructive policies, 
policies which strike a responsive chord in the hearts of our own people and 
in the hearts of others because they are directed not at winning hollow 
propaganda victories but because they are clearly and unerringly directed 
towards peace, not a peace of domination, not a peace of subservience, but 
a peace which decent men and women in Russia, no less than in the United 
States can accept, a peace with which decent men and women throughout the 
world can live. 
Mr. President, it appears that we shall be meeting, in the very 
1ear future, in a summit conference which will deal with the Middle East. 
:t appears, too, that there is some hope that the Executive Branch will 
~ring to that conference at least the beginnings of a constructive policy. 
I think we can look to this conference without trepidation, even with some 
tope of positive achievement, if we leave the press-agentry at home and go 
i:lto it with some honest statesmanship. I think that hope exists regardless 
Of whether the Russians mean to have agreement or not. 
Regardless of the fate of this impending meeting, it is time to 
look beyond it. It is time to look to other major conferences on the 
Middle East and other \vcrld problems. These conferences must come if there 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 39, Folder 69, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 14 -
is, in fact, to be a durable peace. It is essential that we prepare now for 
them, amongst ourselves and with friendly nations. 
I go further, Mr. President, and say this. If we do prepare our-
selves, if we do adjust our policies to realities, then I believe this country 
will be in a position to truce an initiative for peace which will be understood 
and appreciated by the world. I believe this country can, and I hope that 
this country will, call for the international conferences which must be held 
on Asian problems and on European problems, on the dangers of accidental war, 
on the whole range of world-wide problems which hold mankind, numbed on the 
brirut of war. I hope that we shall consider calling these conferences, parti-
cularly if the meeting on the Middle East reveals a serious determination on 
the part of all present to leave the weapons of the propaganda war outside 
the door and get on with the serious business of building the peace which 
the world wants, 'fhich the world needs, which the world must have. 
* * * 
A few months ago, Mr. President, I expressed some thoughts on these 
questions. I believe they still have same relevance to the matters I have 
been discussing with the Senate today. I ask unanimous consent, therefore, 
to include at this point in the record the text of four speeches delivered 
earlier in the year. 
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